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PREFACE 
On June 5, 191 +7, Secretary of State George C. Marshall in 
an address at Harvard University laid the foundation for what 
was to be known as the Marshall Plan. This Plan was to aid 
European nations in regaining their economic stability. 
Great Britain was greatly concerned over regaining her 
position in world affairs and in order to do so realized it 
must regain its economic stability, therefore it took a leading 
role in making the Marshall Plan work. Because of Britain's 
leadership in the Marshall Plan, it has formed important op- 
inions about Marshall Plan aid. 
The purpose of this study has been to find out how Britain 
has accepted the Marshall Plan. The attitudes expressed by 
the British are indicative of the opinions of other European 
countries. In studying these attitudes it has been necessary to 
find out what Britain has achieved through Marshall Plan aid, 
and its relationship with other European countries. 
The chief object in this study has been the study of British 
reaction to the Marshall Plan. It has been difficult to find 
material which would aid in this study because of its recent 
occurrence and the mid-west's lack of British periodicals. How- 
ever sufficient materials were found in the London Times, New 
York Times, and through the British Information Services. 
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Immediately following World War II, it became obvious be- 
cause of the disturbance of the balance of power and the men- 
ace presented by Russia that Western Europe should be rebuilt 
as rapidly as possible. Most countries were on the verge of 
economic prostration, morale was weak, and the danger was 
apparent to everyone. With such a situation existing in west- 
ern Europe it became evident that Communism would spread very 
rapidly, because the people were weakened and had a feeling 
of hopelessness. 
At the Foreign Ministers meeting in Moscow in 191+6, it 
had become evident to the rest of the world that the Soviet 
Union did not want to work for peace, but instead was doing 
its utmost to destroy whatever security existed. The world 
seemed to have split into two parts; Soviet Russia and her 
satellites on one side; the countries still adhering to some 
form of capitalism on the other. 
With conditions such as they were in 1946, the American 
and European statesmen realized they would have to rebuild west- 
ern Europe and do it rapidly in order to maintain a balance of 
power against Russia. It was considered that western Europe 
was the pivot upon which the balance of power rested and in 
order to maintain it, it was necessary that this area become 
economically and politically strong again. 
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One of the first efforts made to aid western Europe econ- 
omically was to continue Lend-Lease for a short time after the 
war. Following Lend-Lease, the United Nations Relief and Re- 
habilitation Administration was founded. Its purpose was to 
supply needy European countries with the necessary food and 
supplies. Besides these two methods of aid, the United States 
also lent large sums of money to several western European 
countries. 
The year of 1947 opened in western Europe with floods, ex- 
tremely low temperatures and severe snowstorms. These acts of 
nature caused coal shortages, stoppage of electricity, commun- 
ication and transportation tieups, and industrial production was 
cut to a minimum. 
While these problems were in the foreground, western Europe 
was also confronted with more basic economic problems. Pro- 
duction was at a minimum because of a shortage of dollars to 
buy raw materials. Overseas markets for production goods had 
been wiped out as had been their overseas investments. 
As an example of the losses sustained let us look at Eng- 
land during and following the war. She had lost $6,000,000,000. 
in physical resources at home during the war, and lost at sea 
ships and cargoes amounting to $3,000,000,000. She had suffered 
a loss of $3,500,000,000. from wastage in industrial production 
and lost the equivalent of $17,000,000,000. through sale of 
assets abroad and the assuming of obligations from Commonwealth 
countries. Added together she had lost a total of about 
$30,000,000,000. or one quarter of her total national wealth.' 
'Britain and the Marshall Aid Program, British Information 
Services, January 1951, p. 2. 
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With the disastrous winter of 1947 behind them, but its 
effects still being felt in every western European country, 
it was acknowledged by most statesmen that the United States 
would have to do even more to help get Europe back on its feet. 
With this idea in mind, Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, 
toured the western European countries in the spring of 1947. 
On his return from Europe, Secretary Marshall spoke at the 
Harvard University Commencement, June 5, 1947. In this speech 
he laid the groundwork for what has been called an "act of un- 
paralleled generosity and friendship". In his speech Mr. 
Marshallmid: 
Our policy is directed not against any country or 
doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and 
chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working 
economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of 
political and social conditions in which free institutions 
can exist. 
It is already evident that, before the United States 
Government can proceed much further in its efforts to 
alleviate the situation and help start the European world 
on its way to recovery, there must be some agreement 
among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of 
the situation and the part those countries themselves will 
take in order to give proper effect to whatever action 
might be undertaken by this Government. It would be neither 
fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake 
to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe 
on its feet economically. This is the business of the 
Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. 
The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in 
the drafting of a European program and of later support of 
such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do 
so. The program should be a joint one, agreed to by a num- 
ber, if not all, European nations.2 
2ttE uropean Initiative Essential to Economic Recovery", 
Department of State Publication, European Series 25, Washington, 
D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1947, pp. 4-5. Entire 
Speech, Appendix A. 
Mr. Marshall called for a concerted effort by western Europe 
to reach economic rehabilitation. He made it clear that 
United States policy was not directed towards any country or 
doctrine but rather towards hunger, poverty, and desperation. 
He felt that the initiative for such a program should come from 
Europe and the job of the United States would be to finance it. 
In the beginning the idea of the Marshall Plan was largely 
economic but gradually as the threat of Soviet aggression grew 
the Marshall Plan developed into a program aimed at attaining 
security through economic means such as the strengthening of 
western Europe. 
Upon the presentation of the speech by Mr. Marshall, west- 
ern European countries "jumped" at the opportunity presented to 
them. He had made it clear that the initiative should come 
from the countries concerned and that the United States should 
only provide assistance when plans had been formulated. It 
was clearly understood that such assistance would only be given 
when plans were definitely approved by the United States. Bri- 
tain and France almost simultaneously seized the opportunity. 
Immediately British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, and 
French Prime Minister, George Bidault, scheduled a meeting at 
which they issued an invitation to the Soviet Foreign Minister, 
Mr. Molotov, to join them in a later meeting to be held in Paris. 
The latter agreed to attend so they met in Paris, June 27, 1947. 
It was at this meeting that Mr. Molotov flatly refused to par- 
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ticipate in the Marshall Plan. Great Britain and France did 
not let Russia's refusal deter them but instead went right 
ahead with their plans and called a conference of all interested 
nations to meet in Paris, July 12, 1947. All told, sixteen 
nations attended the July conference at Paris. These countries 
wasted no time in getting down to work. Immediately they star- 
ted drawing the plans of economic rehabilitation for each 
country. These were integrated until finally on September 22, 
1947, they had ready a program which was designed to restore 
western Europe's economic position by 1952. 
At the same time that the Paris Conference was being held, 
the United States was also investigating the needs of the 
western European nations. There were three separate United 
States committees; one appointed by President Truman, one ap- 
pointed by the Senate, and one appointed by the House of Re- 
presentatives. These committees gathered information on the 
needs of the western European countries and reported their 
fitdings to the President and Congress. Finally in December, 
1947, Congress voted stop-gap aid to meet the urgent needs of 
France, Austria, and Italy. Debates were then held in Congress 
from .January through April until finally the bill was passed 
by both houses and signed by President Truman. 
The Foreign Assistance Act, as the above was known, passed 
Congress April 3, 1948, by majorities of four to one in both 
houses. It called for immediate aid to Europe. The Foreign 
Assistance Act set up the Economic Co-operation Administration 
(ECA) which was to administer the act. Mr. Paul G. Hoffman 
was chosen as head of this agency. 
In Europe, the sixteen nations had met and set up a per- 
manent Organization for European Economic Co-Operation (O.E.E.C.). 
This agency was to work with the ECA in preparing the plans for 
each country on a yearly basis. The O.E.E.0 actually does most 
of the planning, but must have the approval of the ECA before 
funds will be granted for a project. 
The early history of the Marshall Plan has been briefly 
outlined in the preceding pages. The problem remaining will 
be to discover the principal problems which faced Great Britain 
in formulating and accepting the Marshall Plan. 
Among the countries participating in the Marshall Plan, 
Great Britain has probably gained the most through the Marshall 
Plan and has taken the greatest responsibility in seeing that 
it works. As has been already indicated the British economy 
was in a very precarious position by the spring of 1947. In 
1946 Britain had gold reserves of $2,696,000. and by 1949 these 
reserves had shrunk to $1,425,000. The British government con- 
siders $2,000,000. the minimum level of safety.3 
3"Congress Looks Over New Problems Regarding Further Aid 
to Great Britain," Congressional, Digest, 29:6/7, June-July, 
1950, p. 166. 
CHAPTER II 
GREAT BRITAIN'S ECONOMIC POSITION 
In a discussion of the British attitude toward the Mar- 
shall Plan it is first necessary to understand the economic 
situation of Britain following the World War II, what it ob- 
tained from Marshall Plan aid and what it has done with the 
aid obtained. 
Between 1940 and 1950 the United States gave overall aid 
to foreign nations amounting to about $76,000,000,000. and of 
this amount Britain received about 41%.1 Following World War 
II, Great Britain received $2,000,000,000 in Lend-Lease aid 
which was followed by a special loan of $3,750,000,000 from the 
United States and a loan of $1,250,000,000 from Canada. Britain 
assumed this enormous debt in the hope that it would ease her 
immediate recovery problem. At the same time there was the 
hope that it would help to restore multilateral trade through 
a supply of dollars for sterling countries which were desperately 
in need of American exchange in order to continue trade. It 
was expected that this loan would be sufficient for about five 
years. Because of the demand for dollars by the non-dollar na- 
tions of the world for which England was the accepted banker, 
1"Congress Looks Over New Problems Regarding Further Aid 
to Great Britain," Congressional Digest, 29:6/7, June-July, 
1950, p. 166. 
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the loan was used up rapidly in the first half of 1947.2 Bri- 
tain was back to the old problem of a dollar shortage. 
It was realized in Great Britain that recovery of pre-war 
standards would be impossible without an almost superhuman 
effort on her part or outside aid from some country. Britain 
was besides confronted with a serious problem in the lack of 
experienced leaders in Parliament and the Cabinet. The Labour 
Party had gained control of the government at the close of 
the war. The leaders of this party had had little previous 
political experience and their program contained a number of 
economic experiments, the outcome of which would be impossible 
to foresee. 
There was a strong opposition to practically everything 
Labour wished to do. It would take considerable time for 
Labour to estimate the success of its fundamental program, and 
many measures would have to be postponed or tempered by the 
necessity of staying in office. Clinging to office seemed an 
absolute necessity because Labour could not be sure on the 
basis of past elections that it would have another chanph at 
government in the near future. 
Great Britain always has been the banker for the sterling 
area which consists of the United Kingdom, the Irish Republic, 
the Union of South Africa, Burma, Ceylon, Iceland, Iraq, the 
British West Indies, North Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and 
2Britain and the Marshall Aid Program, British Information 
Services, January 1951, p. 3. 
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and British dependencies in various parts of the world. When 
Great Britain received the large loan from the United States, 
over $1,600,000,000 of the credit went to other sterling area 
countries. Following the war Britain had a debt of 83,250,000 
or $13,000,000,000 owing to other countries. Of this debt 
$9,200,000,000 or well over half was to the sterling area.3 
It was small wonder then that it felt it had to protect the 
interest of these countries. On the other side the nations of 
western Europe expected Great Britain to unify its economy 
with theirs. Britain realized the importance of this from the 
standpoint of security and recovery but was determined that any 
arrangement reached should not be to the detriment of the ster- 
ling bloc. 
This presented one of the most serious problems Great Brit- 
ain had to face in accepting the Marshall Plan. The immediate 
economic need for dollars apparently outweighed all other con- 
siderations when the Marshall Plan was suggested. Non-economic 
consideration such as English pride and morale, the dangers of 
British dependence on continental Europe or the United States, 
and the probable loss of friendship with the Soviet Union, 
seemed relatively less important at the time. 
The English pride in their role as leader in world affairs 
is very deeply engrained. When confronted with the possibility 
of losing that position much opposition sprang up in Britain. 
3"British Problem: Empire vs. ERP", U. S. News, 24:20, 
Nay 14, 1948, p. 52. 
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This opposition, plus the Englishman's natural desire for 
independence, made many Britons fearful of the Marshall pro- 
gram and the ultimate effects which would be gained from the 
Marshall Plan. In addition they considered that their sac- 
rifices in World War II entitled them to a certain amount of 
economic compensation, with no strings attached. Many felt 
that Marshall Plan aid, with its many qualifications, would 
strip them of their indeendence and their voice in world 
affairs. 
Besides these two considerations, the British were faced 
with making a trade treaty with the Soviet Union. They feared 
that acceptance of the Marshall program might antagonize 
Russia and cause it to decline any sort of trade treaty relation- 
ship. This proposed treaty would call for Russia to ship 
Britain lumber, grains, and m.nerals in exchange for finished 
products. Russia badly needed finished manufactured products 
and desired the treaty for it was signed shortly after Marshall's 
speech. English public opinion on this point was confused. 
Certain newspapers including the London Times, Independent 
Conservative Daily Express and Liberal News Chronicle seemed to 
believe that there should be no break with Russia simply because 
she refused to join in the Marshall program. Two journals, the 
Conservative Daily Telegraph and the Conservative"Daily Mail 
felt Russia's refusal would probably hasten aid through the 
United States Congress. 4 
New York Times, July 3, 19471 p. 5. 
11 
At this point, it is important to examine the products or 
types of aid that Great Britain obtained from the United States 
through the Marshall Plan. It is interesting to note the 
variety of materials shipped to England by the United States. 
Some of these materials were unprocessed tobacco, petroleum, 
and products, dairy products, meat products, raw cotton, 
industrial machinery, sawmill products, wheat and wheat flour, 
fruits and preparations, copper, iron, and steel mill products, 
chemical specialities, agricultural machinery and implements, 
unmanufactured wool and yarn for manufacturing.5 
By analyzing these materials that were sent to Great 
Britain one can s-e how they hoped to rebuild their economy. 
These materials can be divided into two major divisions: one, 
food commodities, and the other, industrial goods and raw 
materials. The food commodities were needed because of Britain's 
shortages and inability to product enough food for its popu- 
lation. The materials such as raw cotton, unmanufactured wool 
yarn, and unprocessed tobacco were turned into finished pro- 
ducts by British machinery. In order to rebuild their in- 
dustries, Marshall aid sent industrial machinery and agricul- 
tural machinery. Britain was building up her industrial power 
through two methods, use of new equipment and importing raw 
materials. In particular Britain was rebuilding her tradition- 
al industries, particularly the textile and metal industry. 
5United Kingdom, Country Data Book, Economic Cooperation 
Administration, Washington, D. C., March 1950, Table II-10. 
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In sending these goods to Britain, the United States was 
purposely sacrificing its self-interests. Many of these in- 
dustries of Great Britain's were the chief competitors of the 
United States. The United States was willing to sacrifice her 
own economy for two reasons. The first is the most obvious. 
The United States wanted strong allies in case of a third World 
War and realized this was one way to make them. The second 
reason is more long-range. The United States wanted to avoid 
a disruption in world trade which would lead to a future crisis 
for the whole capitalistic world. This could occur if the 
United States did not stimulate competition. 
In view of the above situation it is interesting to note 
the products exported to the United States by Great Britain. 
The principal commodities are whiskey, fabrics, artworks, and 
antiques, creosote oil, books, maps or printed matter, cotton 
cloth, woolen clothing, woolen hosiery, textile machinery and 
parts, motorcycles, needles, platinum, silver-plated ware, 
automobiles, industrial chemicals, cotton yarn, machine-made 
laces, burlap and other materials made from jute, old brass, 
and household articles of flax or hemp.6 
The British exports reveal approximately the same things 
about their economy that an analyses of their imports reveals. 
They exported chiefly manufactured goods such as cotton cloth, 
woolen clothing, motorcycles, automobiles and machine-made laces. 
The goods which they exported can be divided into two parts, 
the manufactured goods mentioned above and luxury goods such 
6 Ibid., Table II-11. 
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as artworks and antiques. Some of the goods Britain exported 
to the United States competed with domestic-made goods while 
others supplemented United States industry. 
It is important to study the indices of imports and exports 
to realize what advances Great Britain has made under the Mar- 
shall Plan. 
Indexes of Imports and Exports? 
1938 = 100 
Period Index of Imports Index of Exports 
19,38 100 100 
1946 68 99 
1947 78 109 
1948 81 136 
1949 - 1st quarter 82 156 
2nd quarter 88 146 
3rd quarter 91 142 
It will be noticed from this table that after 1947 the in- 
dex of exports never falls below the 1938 index of 100 while 
the index of imports never rises to the 1938 index. This is 
indicative of a favorable increase in the balance of trade which 
automatically increased the national wealth. Of course it 
must be realized that the goods provided by the Marshall plan 
helped the country maintain this favorable balance. In the se- 
cond and third quarter of 1949 there was a marked decrease in 
exports and an increase in imports. This was due to the decline 
of American business activity and wholesale prices.8 This de- 
crease in exports and increase in imports caused Britain to 
suffer alarming losses in her gold and dollar reserves. It be- 
came obvious in the summer of 1949 that the rapid decline of gold 
7Ibid., Table 11-7. 
8Ibid., p. 2. 
and dollar reserves was a threat to the world trading area. 
The British government with the advice of the United States 
took several steps to combat the dollar crises. It undertook 
to cut dollar imports drastically, and furthermore to devalue 
the sterling pound by 300. Previously the pound was worth 
$4.03; now it decreased to $2.80.9 
As has been stated, more aid has been given to Great 
Britain than to any other participating country. Between the 
beginning of the Marshall Plan, April 3, 1948 and December 31, 
1949, Great Britain was granted $2,226.4 million. Of this 
total amount 1 131.8 million was for food and agricultural 
commodities, $1,018.6 million was for industrial commodities, 
$5.6 million for technical services and $70.4 million for ocean 
freight services.10 
Breaking these figures down even more, we find the com- 
modities supplies in these amounts: Bread grains, $448.4 million; 
non-ferrous metals and products, $286.7 million; Petroleum and 
products, $242.1 million; sugar and related products, $135.0 
million; lumber and lumber manufactures, $77.1 million; other 
commodities, $462.7 million; technical services,$5.6 million; 
and ocean freight, $70.4 million.11 
9Loc. Cit. 
10Ibid., Table XIV-1 
1 
'Ibid., Table XIV-2. 
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Finally, it is necessary to discover how this aid under 
the Marshall Plan has materially benefitted Great Britain. 
That it has materially benefitted is indicated by statistical 
increases in industrial production, agricultural production, 
decreases in unemployment, the standard of living and other 
factors. 
The index of industrial productivity has risen steadily 
since 1946. Using the year 1938 as the standard of 100, one 
finds the index for total industry standing at 101 in 1946, 
101 in 1947, and 111 in 1948. Breaking this down into large 
groups of industries, one finds in manufacturing, an index 
of 101 in 1946, 103 in 1947, 114 in 1948, and 120 in 1949. In 
mining and quarrying, the index in 1946 is 83, in 1947 is 83, 
and in 1948 has risen to 88. The building and construction 
industries had an index of 75 in 1946, 73 in 1947, and 78 in 
1948. The utilities industry had an index of 101 in 1946, 
101 in 1947, and 111 in 1948.12 The important point in looking 
at this figure is to note that the indexes for 1946 and 1947 
are very close together while the one for 1948 in all indus- 
tries had increased considerably. 
In a consideration of the increase of agricultural pro- 
ductivity there are a number of factors to be considered. The 
index of net production per worker does not necessarily measure 
directly changes in the effectiveness of the farm labor which 
12Ibid., Table VIII-1. 
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was used. Consideration must be given to changes in weather, 
type of seed, irrigation and general efficiency of the farm 
plant.13 
Index of Agricultural Productivity14 
Index Pre-War 1947-1948 1948-1949 1949-1950 
Preliminary 
Farm Workers 100 125 119 118 
Net Production 100 105 123 120 
Net Production 
per worker 100 84 103 102 
Another interesting point in agricultural productivity 
is the decrease in the use of horses and the amazing increase 
in the use of tractors. Using a 1939 pre-war base as an index 
of 100, one finds by 1949 a decrease in horses to 63 and an in- 
crease in tractors to 603.15 
The cost of living Britain shows a steady 
increase since pre-war days but a very gradual increase since 
the war, owing to the regulatory measures of the Labour Govern- 
ment. Using 1948 as 100% one finds the general cost of living 
index to have risen to 104 by December 1949. Breaking down the 
general cost of living one finds food and clothing the highest. 
Food had risen to 110 by December, 1949 and clothing to 107 
by December 1949. Alcoholic beverages and tobacco, and rent 
remained the lowest. Alcoholic beverages and tobacco dropped 
to 99 by December 1949 and rent rose one point to 101 by 
December 1949 16 
13Ibid., Table VIII-2. 
14Loc. cit. 
15Loc. cit. 
16Ibid., Table IX-2. 
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Great Britain has had very little unemployment since the 
war. This can be traced to two causes, first, the socialist 
program which calls for full employment, and secondly, the tre- 
mendous work to be done in rebuilding the nation. The percent 
of the labor force which was unemployed averaged about 1.5 
through 1948 and 1949, 1.5% is a very small percentage of an 
economically active population of 23,030,000, actually about 
345,000 people.17 
From the statistics quoted, it is apparent that Great 
Britain has made tremendous strides in the last few years. 
Marshall Plan aid plus her own desire to succeed have put 
Britain back on her feet. Obviously the British people had to 
sacrifice a great deal to accomplish all they have, but the 
majority have done it willingly and with the knowledge that 
if they didn't, Britain could never regain economic stability. 
17Ibid., Table X. 
Chapter III 
BRITAIN'S RELATION TO EUROPEAN ECONOMICS 
When }h. Marshall made his historic sppech at Harvard, he 
stressed the idea of cooperation between the European coun- 
tries. When the sixteen nation committee met in Paris in 1947, 
they also stressed the importance of cooperation in planning 
and carrying out the Marshall Plan.' 
Of all the participating countries, Great Britain was 
faced with the biggest problem in reconciling its form of 
economy to this policy of cooperation. The British were exper- 
imenting with socialism, while the other nations were canital- 
istic. England had to reconcile not only her form of economy. 
It had another and larger problem to solve before it could give 
full cooperation to the participating countries. This was the 
problem of its relation to the sterling area. 
As has been pointed out previously, Britain maintains the 
position of banker for the sterling area. All sterling is con- 
verted into gold or dollars in London. Britain owed the ster- 
ling area very large sums of money and the only means of re- 
paying this was to stimulate trade with sterling countries. 
This presented a problem in that England also needed dollars 
badly and would rather build up a large export trade with the 
United States and Canada. 
1-See Appendix B for letter from O.E.E.C. report, September 
22, 1947. 
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It has attempted to solve this by building a large export 
trade with dollar countries and then making these dollars 
available to sterling countries. 
Just as Britain took the lead in formulating a plan for 
economic aid, it also took the lead in establishing forms of 
cooperative associations between European nations. On January 
22, 1948, Mr. Bevin in a speech first put forward the idea of 
a western union. It appeared that the European countries were 
waiting for a leader before starting such a program. Britain 
has led in forming economic unions such as the Benelux group. 
However, Britain has shown great reluctance toward forming any 
type of political union. It is generally understood that no 
such political union is possible at this stage in any case, 
but if it were, Britain would undoubtedly refrain from joining 
it. The reason for this dislike by the Labour government of 
the idea of political union stems from the fear that in joining 
such a union they would weaken or lose their socialistic form 
of government. If Britain was to join a political union it would 
be, in all probability, with countries having a capitalistic 
form of economy. In order to make any progress along political 
lines, there would have to be agreement upon certain facts 
which Britain could not accept because they would destroy her 
socialistic form of government. It would be very difficult to 
imagine a capitalistic nation with emphasis on free enterprise 
joining in a political union with a socialistic nation based 
upon planned economy. 
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In October of 1949, Mr. Paul G. Hoffman spoke quite 
strongly before a meeting of the O.E.E.C. on the necessity for 
economic integration. He urged the participating countries 
to integrate their economies more thoroughly and to break down 
more trade barriers between nations. 
On November 1, 19491 Sir Stafford Cripps answered Mr. 
Hoffman's speech and stated the official position of the British 
government. According to the London Times, "The position," he 
said, was that "Britain could not integrate her economy into 
that of Europe in any manner that would prejudice the full 
discharge of her responsibilities as centre of the world's 
largest multilateral trading area and of her special relation- 
ship with the Commonwealth and the sterling area."2 
At the same time he said that Britain felt herself tied up 
with western Europe "not only in economic, strategic, and 
political interest, but in our culture and indeed in our par- 
ticipation in the heritage of Christian civilization."3 
In the same speech, Cripps said if other countries were 
to form regional economic zones, Britain would help them all 
it could. He praised Hoffman's speech and said he felt solid 
and substantial gains had been made in the two years of the 
Marshall Plan.4 




One of the most effective organizations set up was the 
European Payments Union. The purpose of this organization was 
to make it possible for a debtor nation to receive "drawing 
rights" in the creditors' currency. One of the provisions of 
the European Recovery Plan calls for the granting of aid to 
creditor countries in the amount they extend to debtor nations. 
Through this program the exchange of currency was facilitated. 
The European Payments Union first started in October, 1948. 
Under this plan, Britain made $332 million available as "draw- 
ing rights" to European countries.5 During the first year of 
the European Payments Union the "drawing rights" were fairly 
restrictive. In 1949-50 it was provided that 25 percent of the 
"drawing rights" be made expendable multilaterally. In this 
period, Great Britain made available L46.5 million in drawing 
rights. In 1950 it was felt that there was still too much ri- 
gidity in the payment scheme. Britain then took the lead in 
planning a European Payment Union which would be fully multi- 
lateral. On July 1, 1950 the new scheme went into effect which 
sets against each other automatically all credits and debits as 
though one currency were being used. 6 Every participating coun- 
try was given a quota which was either the amount it could lend 
or the amount it could have extended to it if it were a deficit 
5"Britain and the Marshall Aid Program", British Inform- 
ation Services, January 1951, p. 8. 
610c. cit. 
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nation. The total amount set was $3,950 million of which the 
sterling area provided 27 percent or $1,060 million. Besides 
this amount Britain offered $150 million extra which would be 
extended in the Marshall Aid credit for 1950-1951.7 
The various schemes developed to aid further cooperation 
between the participating countries have helped greatly in 
making the Marshall Plan work. It was obvious to the leaders 
of western Europe that some form of cooperation was needed in 
order to rebuild their economies. The breaking down of trade 
barriers and a uniform currency were the two most serious pro- 
blems to be met. Both these problems have been met in the past 
three years and although complete freedom of trade does not yet 
exist, tremendous strides have been taken. This could not be 
accomplished however, without a general trend toward currency 
devaluation. 
In the summer of 19+9, Great Britain's gold and dollar re- 
serves had shrunk to an all-time low which was caused by a de- 
cline of the buyers market in the United States and a decline 
in American business activity. Britain was confronted with a 
very serious problem for with a shortage of reserves the whole 
world trade area was threatened with collapse. It was necessary 
to do something immediately. Many economists thought the answer 
lay in the devaluating the British pound sterling. This seemed 
to be definitely in prospect but in July, Sir Stafford Cripps 
still persisted in denying that the government had any intention 
7Loc. cit. 
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of devaluating the pound. 
In early September, 1949, a three nation meeting of Great 
Britain, Canada, and the United States was called to attempt to 
find some solution to this problem. In the opening meeting 
Sir Stafford Cripps said in talking about a high level of trade, 
"It is still the firm conviction of the Government of the United 
Kingdom that this remains our objective."8 
Of the three countries meeting in Washington, only Canada 
was able to say what it actually believed. The Canadian minis- 
ter pointed out that the United States "must re-examine her 
economics to determine whether ... her tariff policy .... is 
appropriate to the present international position."9 The 
British and Canadians felt that the United States' lack of 
cooperation in a revision of tariff policy was one of the things 
hindering the recovery of Europe and particularly Great Britain. 
In the following talks, although they were kept very se- 
cret, the United States appeared to realize the fallacy of its 
tariff policy and admitted "high tariffs were clearly inconsis- 
tent with the position of creditor countries." It appeared that 
the United States had reversed her former attitude toward the 
sterling area, which was the elimination of sterling and a 
conversion to one currency, and in these meetings recognized 
the need of sterling in maintaining world stability. 
September 8, 1949, p. 4. 8London Times, 
9London Times, September 9, 1949, p. 4. 
10London Times, September 14, 1949, p. 4. 
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In an editorial in the London Times, September 7, 1949, 
it said "possible plans have been outlined for short term assist- 
ance by stockpiling purchases of sterling materials, by immediate 
relaxation of the onerous applications of Customs by widen- 
ing the practical range of goods on which Marshall Aid can be 
spent and by a partial release of this country from its strict 
undertaking not to discriminate against American goods, so that 
cuts in dollar exports could be made without more than the 
inevitable hardships and difficulties. Devaluation will not, 
it is said, be on the Washington agenda, but it will certainly 
haunt every item."11 This editorial believed Britain should 
retrench before devaluing currency or have a problem of inflation 
facing them if they devalue without retrenching. It recognizes 
the problem of devaluation as one of the chief ones facing 
Britain and says if it is not solved the value of sterling will 
dwindle.12 
On September 19, 1949, Sir Stafford Cripps made a radio 
broadcast in Britain to announce the results of the Washington 
meeting. He said: 
"During the weeks between July and our visit to 
Washington our Government has reviewed the whole sit- 
uation and has made some very important decisions. It 
was not only the economic troubles with which we were 
concerned, because without a stable industrial found- 
ation we shall never have a safe defense for our de- 
mocracy or any security for a peaceful future."13 
"London Times, September 7, 1949, p. 5. 
12London Times, September 7, 1949, p. 5. 
13London Times, September 19, 19497 p. 4. 
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He went on to point out the reasons why the Government had 
felt it necessary to devaluate the pound from the old exchange 
rate of $4.03 to a new exchange rate of $2.80. Cripps pointed 
out the dwindling reserves and the need to earn more dollars 
to bolster this reserve. Another reason was that many people 
were converting their sterling into gold and dollars which 
created an unnecessary drag on Britain's reserves. The de- 
valuation should put a stop to that situation because of its 
lower value and also because it was set at the free market ex- 
change rate. He said that the need for full employment affected 
their decision in that the Government had to help so many in- 
dustries in getting dollar reserves to continue production in 
order to have full employment. Cripps stressed the fact thit 
there was no reason for an increased cost of living. Production 
costs must remain low if devaluation was to have the desired 
effect which was to obtain larger exports.14 
It was emphasized by both the Government and the Board of 
Trade that manufacturers should try to take immediate advantage 
of the opportunity to sell more goods abroad.15 
The British people seemed to take the devaluation of the 
pound with resignation and the attitude that the Government 
knew best. They seemed to be more concerned with the effect 
of the lowering of the value of the pound at home than abroad. 
14Loc. cit. 
15London Times, September 21, 1949, p. 4. 
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The press, in general, seemed to believe that the devaluation 
was a painful but necessary step and there was not much crit- 
icism of the act.16 
In an editorial from the London Times, September 26, 1949, 
Sir Stafford Cripps was congratulated on his "conservatism" 
in selecting a level low enough to give some assurance of 
ending the drain on Britain's reserves. No less familiar are 
the accompanying warnings. There is a fear that so fierce a 
cut may have awkward political consequences. It is pointed 
out everywhere that if the unions continue to press for higher 
wages, and the Government gives way, Britain will lose most 
of the benefits of devaluation.17 
In a speech before the House of Commons, Mr. Churchill, 
speaking for the opposition, left no doubt in the minds of his 
listeners as to his opinion of the Government's policy. He 
said he would have been more inclined to set the pound free 
under regular and necessary safeguards and controls, and to 
accept the results than have the present rigid method of setting 
the pound at the lowest possible value. 
18 
However, the Government's bill to devaluate the pound was 
passed very easily by a 138 majority in the House of Commons. 
Many politiciams, including Churchill, had hoped to be able 
to make devaluation an election issue and force the Government 
to call for one. However, the Government was sure it had the 
16 New York Times, September 19, 1949, p. 1. 
17London Times, September 26, 1949, p. 5. 
18London Times, September 29, 1949, p. 4. 
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necessary votes to carry the measure and refused to call for an 
election.19 
The trade unions had been trying for some time to obtain 
higher wages. With the announcement of the Government's policy 
toward production rises it was necessary for something to be 
done to placate the laborers. The Trades Union Congress appointed 
a special committee to study the need of the unions for higher 
wages and how these needs could be made to coincide with the 
Government's policy. In the T.U.C. report they pointed out that 
earnings could rise, without an increase in wages, through 
increased production. The Trades Union Congress made its 
report to the national convention of unions and was met with 
considerable opposition. The unions refused to cooperate with 
the T. U. C. or the government. This, of course, was a serious 
blow to the Labour Party. 
In the October 7, 1949 issue of the Spectator magazine 
there was a rather severe criticism of the Government's de- 
valuation policy. It believed that the Government's plan of 
devaluation might have been a mistake. It believed that Sir 
Stafford Cripp's speech of September 19, 1949 was decidedly 
misleading, especially in the suggestion that prices would not 
rise. The Spectator emi-ected a rise of from five to ten per 
cent. In the circumstances presented, devaluation was needed 
but the Spectator believed the Government didn't present a 
19London Timesl September 30, 1949, p. 4. 
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sufficiently strong program. It believed the effect of de- 
valuation on dollar countries was over-optimistic, because 
Britain must now export thirty percent more than before de- 
valuation in order to obtain the original value. Also the 
Spectator didn't believe the Government's exhortation of in- 
dustry to make larger profits was necessary because private 
enterprises always do make as large profits as possible.2° 
The devaluation policy apparently was the only solution to 
Britain's problem and most economists and politicians were 
agreed on that point. However, considerable opposition was 
given the Labour Government by Conservatives and even some 
Labourites. Most of the opposition was concerned with the me- 
thods by which devaluation was to be carried out rather than 
with the policy itself. 
20 "Revaluation Aftermath", Spectator, No. 6328, 
October 7, 1949, p. I. 
CHAPTER IV 
BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION 
In this next phase of the study it becomes necessary to 
inquire into the state of public opinion in respect to the 
foregoing developments. This will involve an examination of 
leading newspapers and other periodicals which speak for large 
groups of the British public. Of these the London Times, Econ- 
omist, and Spectator are probably the most representative. 
It is interesting to note the ways in which opinion 
changes from the inception of the Marshall Plan to it's con- 
clusion. In discussing the variance of opinion probably the 
most systematic way is the chronological one. 
In a speech before the National Dock Labor Corporation 
June 6, 1948, Mr. Bevin urged Britain to dig for dollars as 
it had dug for victory. Mr. Bevin repeated the Government's 
insistance that it did not want to ask for help from anyone. 
It was well realized in trade and financial circles that if 
Britain was to get help later, when she undoubtedly would need 
it, she first must prove to the United States that Britain was 
worth helping. There were already doubts expressed on how 
Marshall's suggestion about countries getting together and 
deciding on their economic rehabilitation would work out in 
practical terms.' 
In an editorial in the London Times, June 7, 1947, the 
writer is concerned about the acceptance of the Marshall Plan 
'New York Times, June 6, 1947, p. 1. 
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by the American public. There seems to be a clear recognition 
that the United Kingdom would not survive the dollar crises 
without help in the form of dollar credits. Another inter- 
esting point which is brought out in this same editorial was 
the hope that the United States would not insist on a fully 
coordinated economic plan as a condition of assistance. The 
reasons for this were to be found in the diverse interests of 
the separate countries, the absence of elaborate economic plans 
in individual countries and in the difficulty in framing and 
co-ordinating them.2 
The belief expressed in this editorial was voiced a number 
of times before the British finally knew what was actually 
planned. They seemed to be fearful of some encroachment upon 
their rights through dictation of a program by the United States. 
Actually such a thing never came about so their fears were 
quieted. The London Times, June 7, 1947, believed that the 
United States made this offer for two reasons, first, the fear 
that individual loans to one country would not succeed in buil- 
ding western economy and secondly, the growing anxiety on the 
part of American business that failure of European markets 
combined with falling prices at home might lead to a slump.3 
In the same editorial, the author said, "Europe cannot 
afford a merely passive response. It is for European Govern- 
2London Times, June 7, 1947, p. 5. 
3London Times, June 7, 1947, p. 4. 
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ments to ascertain what the United States government really 
requireslto undertake such negotiation and organization among 
themselves as may be needed, and if necessary to explain where 
and why any of the requirements cannot be met. Mr. Marshall 
has produced an idea which is politically courageous as well 
as economically constructive."4- 
In contrast to this last statement is a quotation from 
the New York Times, June 7, 19471 in which it said "there is 
doubt that the British are enthusiastic about Secretary Mar- 
shall's speech and are anxious to see if some practical means 
can be found of helping all Europe, or part of it, to unite in 
efforts toward economic reconstruction." Great Britain appar- 
ently would aid the United States in encouraging all European 
countries to draw up some plans for reconstruction as long as 
it did not build up a western bloc against Soviet Russia.5 From 
this statement it became apparent that the British were fearful 
of antagonizing Soviet Russia. This may be accounted for by 
the proposed trade treaty then being negotiated with Russia. 
The British wanted United States aid but did not want to lose 
their position through accepting it. 
The official government position concerning Mr. Marshall's 
speech was given Friday, June 6, 1947. According to the London 
Times, June 9, 1947, "In official quarters in London, Mr. 
4-London Times, June 7, 19471 p. 5. 
SNew York Times, June 7, 19471 p. 6. 
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Marshall's speech at Harvard on June 5 is warmly welcomed. It 
is felt that it offers a new approach to the problem of the 
reconstruction of Europe. The statement will be an encourage- 
ment to Great Britain and to European countries to pursue with 
fresh vigor their efforts for economic recovery in Europe in 
the knowledge that these efforts will be supported and aided 
by the United States government. It is understood that his 
Majesty's government will take urgent steps to follow up Mr. 
Marshall's proposal with the United States government. At the 
same time we are pursuing trade talks with the U. S. S. R., and 
if these are brought to a successful conclusion it will all 
help to restore an equilibrium in war-torn Europe.66 
The official government attitude was very favorable to 
the Marshall speech and it took a lead immediately in starting 
plans to formulate some means of reconstruction in Europe. The 
reasons for this interest are evident. Britain was in desperate 
need of dollars and saw this as a means of receiving those 
dollars. 
The financial rage of the London Times, also spoke highly 
of the Marshall plan. It lauded the wisdom and courage of the 
United States leaders in contemplating such a plan.7 
6 London Times, June 9, p. 4. 
7 2a. cit., p. 9. 
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It is interesting to note the attitude of an editorial 
from the London Times, June 11, 1947. It called Marshall's 
plan a "golden chance" for recovery in Europe. It pointed out 
that those to whom aid is offered to should not raise doubts 
about the uncertainty of the offer. Their job was to formulate 
a plan Congress could use if they wished. It pointed out the 
largest obstacle to world recovery had been the anaemia of 
Europe. 
It should be indicated at this time that the London Times 
often reflects the attitude of the government in most things. 
So it's statements may be considered as something in the nature 
of semi-official government reaction. 
The British government had been ready to cut imports con- 
siderably more when Mr. Marshall made his speech. After this 
speech it held up these cuts in order to find out what the 
United States was going to propose. The British were set to 
take the initiative immediately after Marshall's speech, but 
they did not know exactly what form of aid the United States 
was considering. Britain was also negotiating a trade agree- 
ment with Russia and did not wish to antagonize her. However 
Britain needed more than wheat, timber and minerals,she needed 
dollars and the manufacturer's materials dollars could buy. 
That is why the Marshall Plan meant so much to Great Britain.9 
That is also why it was so anxious to get some plan formulated 
immediately. 
8London Times, June 11, 1947, p. 5. 
9New York Times, June 11, 1947, p. 17. 
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In a speech before Parliament, Lord Pakenham said Europe 
would eventually recover but only with imaginative action by 
the United States could it achieve prompt and full recovery. 
He said "It was with liveliest interest and genuine pleasure 
that we in this country have read Mr. Marshall's speech, which 
might well mark an epoch."10 He felt the responsibility was 
placed on the shoulders of the European nations to work out 
their needs and coordinate them with each other. 
In speaking before a foreign corresnondent's luncheon, 
Mr. Bevin hailed Mr. Marshall's Harvard speech as one of 
history's greatest. He said Britain would take the initiative 
in preparing a joint economic program for Europe. -2 
It is interesting to note this obvious willingness of 
Great Britain to take the lead in preparing a program for 
European recovery. As has been indicated previously this could 
probably be accounted for by Britain's desperate need and also 
her interest in rebuilding her trade with Europe and the United 
States. 
There appeared to be an extreme feeling of urgency for 
cooperation among European countries on some plan to give the 
United States. The knowledge that their dollars would not 
10London Times, June 12, 1947, p. 8. 
11Ibid. 
12New York Times, June 14, 1947, p. 1. 
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last very long was probably influential in this feeling.13 
Another point which may have influenced the speed with 
which Mr. Bevin started plans for a meeting of European nations 
was the desire of Britain to have a plan for European recovery 
drafted before the Presidential elections in November. The 
reason behind this was to help Mr. Marshall in getting aid 
passed through Congress or at least not add to his difficulties. 
14 
The plans to meet were carried out rapidly and on June 18, 
1947, Mr. Bevin went to Paris where he met with M. Ramadier 
and M. Bidault. They discussed plans for a meeting of all Eur- 
opean nations who were interested and also issued an invitation 
to Mr. Molotov to meet with them in a second preliminary meeting. 
At the same time Mr. Bevin was meeting in Paris, back in 
England "the general council of the United Nations Association 
of York passed a resolution welcoming the declaration by Mr. 
Marshall, the American Secretary of State, of American interest 
in a coordinated economic plan for Europe. The resolution 
urged the government to take the lead in bringing this proposal 
before the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe with a 
view to immediate action, without regard to the political and 
economic structure of any country requiring assistance.15 
13London Times, June 14, 1947, p. 5. 
1 41Vew York Times, June 15, 1947, p. 7. 
15London Times, June 16, 1947, P. 4. 
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This assertion holding that economic recovery should be 
handled by some organizEtion already set up, appeared to have 
a number of advocates. In a letter to the Editor published in 
the London Times, June 19, 1947, the author stated he was against 
composing another oganization to propose and work out a plan 
for European relief. He suggested that one of the Committees 
then in operation do the work and he particularly favored the 
Economic Co-mission for Europe. He continued by stating, "To 
the objection .... that an organization in which an American 
delegate participates is not the kind of body Mr. Marshall en- 
visaged when leaving the 'initiative' to Europe, it should be 
replied that a broken, bewildered Europe may well need American 
initiative as well as dollars and that, among truly united 
nations, there are no frontiers, not even European or American. 
At any rate, do not let us multiply our organizations; ordinary 
people are already growing tired of them."16 
This is an interesting statement in that apparently Britons 
or at least a segment of them are tired of so much bureaucracy. 
Also the attitude of desiring American initiative is interesting. 
It raised the question of whether Britons felt capable of form- 
ulating a plan which would aid them materially or whether if 
the plan failed they desired to have an American scape goat. 
In another letter to the Editor published in the London 
Times. June 18, 1947, the writer urged strong support on both 
16London Times, June 19, 1947, p. 5. 
37 
sides of the Atlantic to put across the Marshall Plan. He 
said, "If the United States can rise to the height of this 
great opportunity, can Europe? Europe has become a geograph- 
ical expression and little more. Mr. Marshall's offer is to 
Europe; not to one or two countries. And manifestly a prompt 
and striking response can alone enable him to confirm the offer. 
The opportunity is a fleeting one and Mr. Bevin has leaped to 
seize it. He is entitled to the ardent support, in what will 
be a momentous effort, of all who appreciate the gravity of 
the choice that falls to be made."17 
Immediately following Marshall's proposal, British mar- 
kets showed signs of weakening rather than strengthening as had 
been expected. The reason for this decline was based upon the 
skepticism which some quarters felt toward the Marshall Plan. 
However, the financial press on a whole praised the Marshall 
announcement. It was felt that the Marshall Plan needed more 
publicity by the government to impress the people of their need 
for it and the greatness of the offer. 18 
A group which very vigorously denounced the Marshall plan 
was left-wing group in the Labour Party. They denounced it as 
a capitalistic scheme to gain control over Europe. Also the 
leaders of Leftist labor unions such as the Amalgamated Engin- 
eering Union and the Amalgamated Union of Foundry Workers both 
spoke out denouncing the power the United States would have over 
British economy and urging closer ties with Soviet Russia.19 
17London Times, June 18, 1947, p. 5. 
18New York Times, June 18, 1947, p. 6. 
19New York Times, June 18, 1947, p. 6. 
38 
This attitude was not widespread in Britain but was mainly 
confined to smell leftist groups who were fearful of the influ- 
ence of the capitalistic economy of the United States on soc- 
ialist Britain. 
During June of 1947, Britain was anxious to have the co- 
operation of Russia in preparing a program for recovery. The 
reasons for this are two-fold. Britain desired the completion 
of its trade negotiations with Russia and it also felt that a 
program for recovery would have greater chances of succeeding 
if Soviet Russia and its satellites would join in the Plan. 
However, it was generally considered that if Russia refused to 
cooperate Britain would press forward plans for a summer meet- 
ing of all interested countries. In a speech before the House 
of Commons Mr. Bevin bluntly warned the Soviet Union that the 
state of appeasement was over. He made it clear that Britain 
was ready to go ahead swiftly with Marshall plan proposals with 
or without Russia. He emphasized his willingness and Britain's 
to make a plan for Mr. Marshall and said that speed was essential. 
He made it plain he would not stand for Russian delaying tac- 
tics. Both Conservatives and Labour leaders praised the Mar- 
shall plan in the House of Commons. 20 
The British government very strongly advocated a rapid 
meeting of interested European countries. It was willing to 
forget the usual formalities in order to have an early meeting. 
As has been pointed out previously Britain realized its critical 
20New York Times, June 20, 1947, p. 1. 
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need of dollars and therefore favored an early program. 
An editorial in the London Times, June 21, 1947 shows 
that the British public was apparently aware of the crisis 
they were approaching. In calling it a "second chance" the 
writer states "the conviction that the countries of Europe 
must stand or fall together" and that it "would seem to be at 
once the inspiration and the challenge of the American offer 
to help". Also he felt a strong conviction that they must 
grasp the opportunity before it might be withdrawn.21 
The British welcomed the news June 241 that Mr. Molotov 
would meet in Paris with Bevin and Bidault but their enthusiasm 
was tempered by doubt. 22 With the knowledge of RussiOd well- 
known dilatory tactics the British did not expect much to come 
out of the Paris meeting. 
The meeting between Britain, France and Russia did break 
down with Mr. Molotov's statement that Russia was not interested 
and he branded it as a capitalistic scheme. Mr. Bevin in a 
statement to the press said this breakdown would not deter 
Britain from her determination to aid in formulating a program 
for Europe.23 Apparently the British press held little bitter- 
ness toward Russia for her refusal to join. The general con- 
sensus was that without Russia, Congress would be more likely 
to pass a bill rapidly for European aid.24 
21London Times, June 21, 1947, p. 5. 
22New York Times, June 24, 1947, p. 5. 
23New York Times, July 3, 19471 p. 4. 
24Ibid., p. 5. 
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The nations of Europe that were interested in participa- 
ting in an aid program were invited to meet in Paris, July 12, 
1947, to formulate a plan to present to the United States. The 
French proposal of a steering committee with six special- 
ized committees which would draw up a balance sheet indicating 
the potential increase in production and trade among themselves, 
and also determining the additional amount of aid which would be 
needed, was accepted as the basis for the Paris Conference. 
In Britain at the time of the Paris Conference the people 
were considerably heartened by the progress the sixteen nations 
were making. There was feeling in Britain that what mattered 
most was getting a plan ready for presentation to the United 
States as soon as possible. At the same time the Communist 
Party in Britain was following Moscow's lead in denouncing the 
Marshall Plan as an attempt by the United States to place Europe 
under her economic contro1.25 The head of the National Union 
of Mine Workers, Will Lawther, addressed the annual conference 
of the Union, July 7, 1947. He praised the idea of the Marshall 
Plan and then proceeded to blast the United States. He critic- 
ized the "American way of life" and capitalism in the United 
States, going on to praise communism. Lawther was not a com- 
munist himself though many officers in his union were. It is 
doubtful, however, whether he spoke for the majority of mine 
workers or merely for a small minority. In his speech he backed 
25New York Times, July 16, 19471 P. 5. 
the Government's demand for more coal and set an even higher 
goal than the Government.26 
This is an example of the attitude found in some groups in 
England. It is mostly the result of propaganda spread by 
Communists who in the main were a small minority of the popu- 
lation. Another attitude was expressed by Sir Clive Baillieu, 
recently retired president of the Federation of British Indus- 
tries who spoke before the Midland region of the federation 
in Birmingham. He praised Mr. Marshall for his foresight in 
offering aid, saying it was up to Britain to work for her suc- 
cess and for the salvation of Europe. He said to farget about 
war indebtedness for their sacrifices and to get down to work 
to build theirs and Europe's economy.27 The attitude expressed 
by this representative of the manufacturing group was generally 
accepted by the whole group. The probable reason for this 
was their greater knowledge of the crisis confronting Britain!s 
economy and the great need for dollars to rebuild it. 
In commenting on the progress of the sixteen-nation con- 
ference in Paris an editorial in the London Times, September 3, 
1947, said "Something more than the mere addition of needs has 
been achieved, but a good deal less than the far-reaching inte- 
gration of western European economies looked for by those whose 
enthusiasm outran their grasp of the facts. The limited 
26New York Times, July 8, 1947, p. 11. 
27New York Times, July 26, 19+7, p. 6. 
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objectives of the conference give no proof of incapacity to 
see things clearly and to see them whole. Europe stands on 
the threshold of a decisive autumn and what may become a dis- 
astrous winter. Never has self-help seemed more urgent. If 
the total estimate to be presented to the United States by the 
Paris commission seems much in excess of what is right or reason- 
able, it must be remembered that not only the far-reaching inter- 
national commitments falling to the. European countries since 
the war but also the honest attempts to institute more liberal 
trading agreements prematurely have cost far more than could 
have been foreseen. The rehabilitation of Europe depends first, 
upon self-help, but it depends also upon outside factors, upon 
the acquisition of dollars with which to buy capital equipment 
as well as food and other relief supplies from dollar countries 
and upon the elimination to the fullest extent possible of 
commercial barriers between eastern and western Europe.28 
Evidently the London Times, was satisfied with what the sixteen- 
nation commission was doing and felt it would present a worth- 
while program to the United States. 
An interesting event happened in the first Dart of Sep- 
tember and created quite a discussion. In a speech before 
the annual meeting of the Trades Union Congress at Southport, 
England, September 3, 19471 Mr. Bevies called upon the United 
States to redistribute their gold reserves stored in Fort Knox. 
He said he realized America would be upset by this proposal 
28London Times, September 3, 19471 p. 5. 
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but that he always had to upset somebody. His suggestion took 
the British foreign office and Treasury by surprise. He also 
called for a customs union throughout the Empire which would 
make possible a free flow of goods. Again he said this was his 
yn idea and not endorsed by the Cabinet. Bevin told the dele- 
gates, who represented 7,500,000 workers, that they must endure 
a lower standard of living and work harder.29 Mr. Bevin spoke 
at Southport as a Labour leader to a Labour assembly.3° 
According to the New York Times, September 5, 1947, Bevin's 
proposal of redistributing the gold in Fort Knox, was regarded 
in British Government quarters as "an idea well worth examining." 
Although not stated plcinly Mr. Bevin's speech indicates the 
quanlry in Britain as to what to do about the economic situation. 
The New York Times calls Mr. Bevin's plan unsound economically 
because it would lead to inflation in the United States.31 
Another attitude was expressed by the Washington, D. C. cor- 
respondent of the London Times, September 6, 1947. He felt 
Mr. Bevin's speech was both ill-timed and ill-advised. It was 
a very poor time because of the difficulty to be expected in 
passing the Marshall Plan through Congress anyway.32 
An interesting commentary on the morale of the British 
people was published in the New York Times, September 5, 1947. 
It said "The British are not in a very good mood to face the 
impending economic crisis. They are blaming others for their 
29New York Times, September 4, 1947, p. 1. 
30London Times, September 4, 1947, p. 4. 
31New York Times, September 5, 1947, p. 1. 
32London Times September 61 1947, p. 4. 
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difficulties which is not a British trait. They are trying 
to preserve their glory, reconstruct their island, maintain 
their old standard of living, liquidate part of their empire 
and conduct a modest political and social revolution all at 
the same time. Anyone of these would be a feat in itself. 
They are trying to do all at once. The common man is not 
worried and he has enough food so he is coasting. There is 
considerable absenteeism among the workers and employees 
alike.m33 
On September 12, 1947, another criticism of Mr. Bevin 
was made by the Washington correspondent of the London Times. 
He said it would be more helpful if European statesmen would 
make as few statements as possible which might be turned against 
the Marshall Plan because it was going to be hard enough to get 
it passed through Congress the way it was. The correspondent 
was making reference to a speech Mr. Bevin made before the 
American Legion in London on September 10, 1947, in which he 
said "I do not mind whether it is lend-lease or what." It was 
felt in Washington circles that he was trying to influence the 
form United States policy should take in regard to foreign aid. 
An interesting comment on the economic situation con- 
fronting England and Europe was made in an editorial in the 
London Times, September 15, 1947. The author said, "The course 
of the Paris discussions on the Marshall Plan has driven home 
33New York Timesl September 5, 1947, p. 3. 
34-London Times, September 12, 1947, p. 4. 
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in this country, and through-out the English speaking world, 
the lesson which became apparent with the ending of the Amer- 
ican loan. No sound economic life is possible for Great 
Britain or indeed any other country which depends upon running 
American subsidies in one form or another; and if the American 
loan to Britain helped to delay general recognition of this 
truth, it rendered in this respect a poor service both to lender 
and borrower. 
"Nor, even if the prospect of American aid were more 
copious than seems likely, is dependence on such aid a policy 
which would commend itself for any length of time to this coun- 
try."35 Apparently this writer feels that only European coun- 
tries which really try to succeed and plan accordingly will 
have a chance of rehabilitation. He believes Europe must 
learn to struggle and work harder if it hopes to achieve any 
semblance of its former self without being merely a satellite 
of the United States. It was up to Europe to succeed through 
her own efforts with the aid of the United States. 
On September 22, 1947, the Committee for European Economic 
Cooperation finished its report on the needs of the various 
countries and what they would have to do to rehabilitate them- 
selves. In London, the report of the sixteen-nation committee 
in Paris on Marshall Aid provoked a grim determination for it 
35London Times, September 15, 1947, p. 5. 
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set goals hard to attain. The main concern was over how much 
Congress would grant and whether it would be enough to do the 
job. Some quarters felt the Government had set unattainable 
goals in coal and stee1.36 On the signing of the sixteen- 
nation report, Mr. Bevin said it was "a long road to travel" 
before Europe could get on its feet. He said, "We have set 
our hand on the plough. We must not be deflected from our 
purpose."37 
An editorial in the London Times, September 23, 1947, 
apparently believes that C. E. E. C. has made a good plan and 
says that it is now up to the United States to carry out her 
part of the bargain. It said, "It would be no impertinence 
in any circumstances for Europe to seek aid from the United 
States in the rebuilding of her economy, but that will not 
make Europe the less grateful to the United States for having 
taken the initiative herself."38 Most British newspapers gree- 
ted the Paris report enthusiastically except for the London 
Daily Worker which said, "He who pays the piper calls the tune" 
and "the dollar boys will run Western Europe, Inc." It said 
that Marshall was playing a "cat and mouse game" with Britain.39 
Of course, the attitude of the Daily Worker, as the official 
36New York Times, September 23, 1947, p. 12. 
37London Times, September 23, 1947, p. 4. 
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39New York Times, September 24, 1947, p. 29. 
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communist organization is obvious. The Communist Party in 
Great Britain took every opportunity that was presented to 
lambaste the Marshall Plan. 
In the fall and winter of 1947 and 1948 the Marshall 
Aid bill was under consideration by Congress. In Britain 
there were a number of speeches made which showed British 
appreciation of Marshall Aid. Lord Layton, chairman of the 
Board of the News Chronicle, in a speech before the United Na- 
tions Association in London said the unselfishness of the United 
States had established a new precedent in international rela- 
tions. He said a united, independent Europe was a necessity 
for world survival, and the Marshall plan would be the instru- 
ment. 40 
In a speech November 16, 1947, Mr. Bevin said he re- 
gretted Russia's boycott of the Paris meeting on European re- 
covery. He repeated that Mr. Marshall's speech at Harvard in 
June, 1947, offering the help of the United States in European 
reconstruction, was "one of the best and most statesmanlike 
since the war closed." He rejected the idea, insistantly 
dessiminated by Soviet propaganda, that this offer implied 
the domination of European countries by the United States. 
41 
An interesting comment by Anne O'Hare McCormick in the New 
York Times of December 13, 191+7, reveals British attitude. 
1441New York Times, November 12, 1947, p. 8. 
4 New York Times, November 16, 191 +7, p. 1. 
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She says, While British reaction reveals how the people of 
this country dislike dependence on the United States, and how 
pathetically, in common with people everywhere, they grasp at 
the slightest sign of Russian reasonableness, they have no more 
illusions than Sir Stafford Cripps that the only hope of sal- 
vation lies in American aid in the organization of Western 
Europe. This becomes clearer to the man in the street with 
every meeting of the Big Four."42 After the failure of the 
Big Four Foreign Ministers Conference in London in the first 
week of December, Miss McCormick remarked in the New York Times 
of December 20, 1947, "The British have a more vital interest 
than the United States in building up western Europe. There 
is no longer any doubt in official circles that their very life 
depends upon it. In England there has been a striking psychol- 
ogical change during the past month. The heavy air is lighter 
with the first hope of recovery. Christmas spirit is livelier 
than at any time since 1940. The increase in production though 
accompanied by no promise of a better life, has an extraordinary 
effect on the spirit of the people. The point of these obser- 
vations is that the stronger internal position will have an 
effect on foreign policy also. This is already indicated by 
the cheerfulness of Mr. Bevin and Mr. Cripps in accepting the 
conclusions to be drawn from the failure of the London Confer- 
ence and turning at once to the next step."43 A news story in 
112New York Times, December 13, 1947, p. 14. 
43New York Times, December 20, 1947, p. 16. 
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the New York Times, December 18, 1947 said after the failure 
of the Big Four Foreign Ministers Conference, Britain would 
reshape her foreign policy to the paramount necessity of making 
the Marshall Plan work. It would entail the utmost in economic 
recovery at home. The article said this would undoubtedably 
lead to a clash between Russia and Britain. It went on to 
say the Communist Party in Britain had called upon all supporters 
to fight the Labour Government. This was virtually sabotage 
of the British production effort. The Communists in Britain 
although small in membership carry great weight in the labor 
unions. Most British opinion seems to be critical of Mr. Bevin 
for having tried too hard and too long to placate the Soviet 
Union." A few days after this story appeared Mr. Bevin made 
a speech before a luncheon held for the Association of American 
Correspondents in London. Foreign Secretary Bevin urged the 
Russians to stop the conflict over the European Recovery Pro- 
gram. He said the door was still o-)en to them to join. However, 
he made it clear Britain would do her utmost to help herself. 
He said he believed there could be complete cooperation between 
British socialism and American capitalism as long as both coun- 
tries believed in principles of agreement, secure tolerance and 
the acceptance of democracy as they understood it.1+5 
One reason for this more appreciative attitude among the 
British toward the Marshall Plan probably stems from the fact 
that they are going to be forced to cooperate to support each 
New York Times, December 18, 1947, p. 20. 
New York Times, December 23, 1947, p. 6. 
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other against any aggression of Soviet Russia's making. Also 
the public appeared to be tired of the appeasement which had 
been offered to Russia by the British Government. Another 
factor in their change of attitude was the sure knowledge that 
the United States was actually going to give them the aid they 
needed. At this time it became more easy to see the time when 
such aid would be coming whereas in the spring of 1947 it seemed 
more a dream or idea but now the plan was taking on a semblance 
of reality. 
In the New Statesman and Nation, December 13, 1947, is 
an interesting comment on the passage of the Marshall Plan 
through Congress. It says, "Every tirade of Molotov's spurs 
on the Marshall program. It would be one of the grimmest post- 
war paradoxes that if Russia would suddenly turn mild and con- 
ciliatory, America's instinct for isolationism might corres- 
pondingly assert itself, and the amount of Marshall Plan aid 
would thereby proportionately diminish."46 This is an inter- 
esting insight into the United States' reasons for granting 
aid to western European countries. This attitude of Russia 
against the United States undoubtedly did hurry the passage 
of the Foreign Assistance Act. 
An interesting incident during the winter of 1948 occurred 
when the Communist Daily Worker and Lord Beaverbrook's very 
conservative Daily Express were on the same side for once. 
46 "Congress and the Marshall Plan", New Statesman and 
Nation, 34:875, December 13, 1947, p. 1. 
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It seems neither one of them desired American dollars or 
dependency but for entirely different reasons. The Communist 
newspaper because it wanted England entirely socialistic and 
Lord Beaverbrook for exactly the opposite reason which was 
that Britain should remain entirely independent by using the 
wealth of the Empire.47 Beaverbrook believed in the sound 
foundation of the Empire and advocated maintaining Britain's 
position by drawing on her colonies. Of course the Daily 
Worker wanted to swing Britain to the side of Russia through 
socialism. This attitude was untenable in the face of the tre- 
mendous problem with which Britain was confronted. 
In the London Times throughout the spring of 1948 until 
the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act on April 3, can be 
found comments on the progress of the bill through committee 
hearings and Congress. Apparently there was great interest 
in the rapid passage of the bill and the amount of aid it would 
grant western Europe. 
An editorial from the London Times, April 5, 1948, ex- 
pressed the prevailing feeling in most quarters of Britain on 
the passage of the Act. 
The passage of the Foreign Assistance Act and 
the unfolding from now forward of the European Re- 
covery Programme mark a milestone in the history of 
the United States. The task now is for the countries 
of Europe to respond with an equal courage and vigor. 
Mr. Truman has called this measure an 'answer to the 
challenge facing the free world today'. In fact it 
47"If There Were No Dollars", New Statesman and Nation, 
35t888, March 13, 1948, p. 1. 
52 
is only the beginning of an answer. Whether the answer 
will be given, as it can now be given, with achievement 
and conviction, depends upon the will and the ability 
of the sixteen-nations to work together as one and with 
wisdom in giving fresh life and a new shape to the mat- 
erial and spiritual resources of Europe. If the Marshall 
Plan founders now, or the Comm zi st wreckers have their 
way it will be Europe's fault. 
In the New York Times, April 4, l948, their London cor- 
respondent wrote that the passage of the European Recovery 
Program bill in Congress brought rejoicing to Britain coupled 
with expressions of determination to play the game fairly. 
Britain realized that to save itself it must help save Europe. 
Britain pledged her utmost to make the Marshall Plan work.49 
The following message was sent by Mr. Attlee to Mr. Tru- 
man: 
On the passing of the Economic Cooperation Act 
of l948, I desire to express to you, Mr. President, 
on behalf of of the 
United Kingdom, our deep gratification at this act 
of unparalleled generosity and statesmanship. The act 
will be welcomed not only in the United Kingdom but 
all over the world wherever free peoples can express 
their opinions. It is an encouragement to all to 
press on to the solution of Europe's difficulties 
and towards the establishment of a-stable, free, and 
healthy world economy. The people of the United 
Kingdom are at one with the people of the United 
States in this endeavor, and we shall apply our whole 
energies to its accomplishment. 50 
The British magazine, Economist, said upon the passage 
of the act that all Europe should recognize the Marshall Plan 
for what it is -- "an act without peer in history." 
48London Times, April 5, 1948, p. 5. 
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It continued by saying, "It will be difficult, after this 
demonstration of international solidarity, to go on repeating 
the old gibes about American isolationism, the old complacent 
references to American political immaturity. "51 
Numerous other British newspapers and magazines expressed 
their deep appreciation to the United States.52 One of the most 
interesting expressions, however, came from a British housewife, 
Betty Burges. Mrs. Burges wrote a letter to the New York Times 
in which she said: 
I want to express what millions of my countrymen must 
be feeling when they read that President Truman has af- 
fixed his signature to the Aid bill bringing relief to 
Europe; and that is to say 'Thank you'. 
We have read here with the deepest interest the re- 
ports of the debates in the Senate and House, but when 
all the arguments have been weighed, what stands out 
clear above them all, is the good-will which has prompted 
this great act of statesmanship. We all feel heartened 
and encouraged by this striking testimony that the intel- 
ligent way to solve world problems is to apply to them the 
same standards of conduct that we try to apply lin our own 
individual lives. We know by experience that if a large 
group of our neighbors are suddenly impoverished it is to 
our interest to help restore their prosperity because 
there is a fundamental unity among mankind. The news 
gladdens us with an example of good neighborliness on a 
huge scale. 
We in land are not ashamed that we have had to 
spend the wealth of generations in fighting in two World 
Wars from the first day to the last. We are not in the 
least downhearted because we have to struggle against for- 
midable difficulties - it is stimulating to find means to 
overcome them. But we are deeply grateful that such gen- 
erous aid should be given to us by our friends and com- 
rades, the American people; and I feel sure that we shall 
prove our gratitude by doing all we can to restore our 
own prosperity and that of our neighbors. 53 
51"Unsordid Act", Economist, 154:5459, April 10, 191+8, p.l. 
52See Appendix C. for other comments. 
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It is obvious from these comments that Britain was both 
grateful and appreciatite of United States aid. Probably at 
no other time during the conception and working of the Marshall 
Plan were the British people more strongly united to their 
appreciation of the United States' statesmanship and genero- 
sity. 
On May 6, Great Britain informed the Economic Cooperation 
Administration of their intentions of complying with the for- 
eign Assistance Act and received a grant of $33,500,000 dollars, 
for the purchase of wheat, flour and bacon from CanadaJ4 Coun- 
tries each signed separate agreements with the United States 
after the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act. However before 
Britain signed the Arep-American Economic Cooperation Agreement 
a disturbance in the tranquility occured in London where Mr. 
Truman's envoy, W. Averell Harriman was conferring with the 
British Government. He said the United States was considering 
its policy toward the sterling area. This caused considerable 
consternation in financial circles. There had been much talk 
that certain quarters in Washington desired to weaken or even 
break up the sterling area, and those fears were intensified 
by Harriman's statement, although he said there had been no 
formulation of United States policy yet.55 An editorial in 
the London Times, May 25, 1948, believed that with the esta- 
blishment of Economic Cooperation Administration headquarters 
54New York Times, May 6, 1948, p. 1 
55New York Times, May 14, 1948, p. 11. 
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in Europe the United States would take a stand against the 
sterling areas of which Britain was the leader. There had al- 
ready been considerable coTment on the subject and in the United 
States prominent statesmen had stated that there would be an 
eventual need for "some European currencies" to be devaluated. 
It said, "In England there is considerable speculation as to 
whether the sterling areas were being referred to." In the 
matter of devaluation it said "this country can be assured, it 
would seem, of being wholly its own master and reserving the 
initiative entirely to itself." The editorial believed at that 
time Government leaders could see no justification for deval- 
uating the sterling. It said "There is no reason to suppose 
that conditions have changed or are changing in any way which 
would invalidate that conclusion."56 
This fear on the part of Great Britain at this time is 
interesting in considering the devaluation move they were forced 
to take the following year. Apparently their fears at this 
time were unfounded. Because of this attitude, however, many 
Britons were concerned over United State's domination in po- 
litical matters. 
There had been numerous accusations against the United 
States of imperialism, mainly by the Communists. The New York 
Times, June 9, 1948, said, "Because of such allegations and 
suspicions, the British Government has been required to give 
56 
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repeated guarantee that it would not accept any agreement that 
might infringe upon British sovereignty." It continued by saying 
supporters of the European Recovery Program have denied that 
the United States has any intention of dictating British policy. 
Britain is quite willing to stabilize her currency, maintain a 
valid rate of exchange, balance her budget and maintain con- 
fidence in her monetary system, but it wants to do it in its 
own way and not under actual or implied pressure from the United 
States.57 
This is a good summary of Britain's feelings toward any 
form of intervention by the United States. It had been it's 
belief since the inception of the Marshall Plan and will be 
found through the years the Marshall Plan was in effect in Great 
Britain. Such a country as England with her proud history can 
hardly be blamed for such an attitude. 
A very interesting comment on British and American opinion 
was made in the Illustrated London News, JOne 19, 1948, by 
Cyril Falls, Chichele Professor of the History of War at Ox- 
ford. He started by commenting on the fact that after granting 
a sum of money for the European Recovery Program, Congress 
wanted to cut its appropriations about 25%. He points out 
that Marshall and Taft had said the United States had a moral 
obligation to uphold. Observers in England feel that the 
future of aid would be in the hands of a Republican President 
57 New York Times, June 9, 1948, p. 9. 
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and Congress. Mr. Falls continues by saying, "Opinion in the 
United States has been critical of this country for upwards of 
three years." He believes American journalists and visitors 
are responsible for spreading this attitude. They apparently 
felt that English workers are not trying as hard as those in 
some other countries including the United States, therefore why 
should United States workers work for somebody who is not trying? 
In England there has been criticism of the United States foun- 
ded in part upon jealousy and in part upon mistrust of what 
some quarters regard as "unbridled capitalism" and "unjustified 
freedom" for private enterprise. Another criticism he pointed 
out was that England could not go on with its socialist pro- 
gram without the aid of Lend-Lease, American Loan and the 
prospect of Marshall Plan aid. He believes this criticism is 
unjustified because the Marshall Plan is to be based upon 
political structure rather than economic structure which would 
be justifying England's criticism that the United States were 
forcing our system upon England. However Mr. Falls said "de- 
spite all differences and misconceptions, there exists today a 
broader understanding and a truer sympathy between Britain and 
the United States than was the case before the war.58 Mr. Fall's 
analysis of British feelings toward Americans is probably 
correct. 
58Illustrated London News, June 19, 1948, p. 686. 
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The extreme Left-Wing of the British Labour Party suffered 
a severe setback and lost its belligerence in the face of over- 
whelming opposition by the rest of its members at the 47th annual 
conference. It was this group who branded the European Recovery 
Program as an "imperialist plot" and who advocated closer rela- 
tions with Soviet Russia.59 This defeat of the left-wing pro- 
bably helped the signing of the Anglo-American Economic Cooper- 
ation Agreement. 
Bi-lateral talks were concluded June 26, 1948, and the ones 
with Britain, France, Sweden, and Denmark right at first prac- 
tically eliminated all the difficulties envolved, and therefore 
the talks proceeded faster. The plans were to be not only pre- 
sented to the respective governments but recommended by their 
negotiators. 60 The signing date for the bi-lateral agreements 
was set for July 3. Great Britain's Government decided to post- 
pone its signing until after the deadline in order to deliberate 
longer in the House of Commons. The London Timeq thought there 
was going to be some opposition to the agreement from both 
sides of the House and it would be a matter for careful and 
deliberate handling. 
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Debates started in the House of Commons June 30, 1948. 
Sir Stafford Cripps spoke before the House on the opening day 
59New York Time 
6°London Times, 
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in which he outlined the parts of the agreement which had been 
reached between the United States and Great Britain. The Com- 
mons cheered when Cripps said "This provision makes it quite 
clear that his Majesty's Government is the sole judge of how it 
shall use its best endeavors and as to what measures it shall 
adopt."62 
The London Times, July 1, 1948 said that,: 
"The terms of the agreement are still being studied 
but so far the indications are that it will be approved 
by two Houses without much opposition. There will be 
strong criticism of detail, but since the need for such 
an arrangement seems inescapable in present circumstances 
the agreement will be reluctantly accepted. 
The reluctance does not imply any lack of appreciation 
of American generosity in her efforts to aid Europe, but 
reflects only the feeling of regret that Britain should 
be dependent upon external aid."°-5 
A motion was introduced July 2, 1948, in the House of Commons 
and tabled which redd: 
"That this House, while welcoming the prospect of 
the economic aid which Great Britain's disproportionate 
sacrifices in the late war entitles her to expect un- 
conditionally and as of right, reqtests his Majesty's 
Government to negotiation for the removal of conditions 
liable to involve foreign control of Great Birtain's 
internal finances and foreign penetrations of her col- 
onies; and which are also,ikely to harm the British 
Commonwealth of Nations."04 
This bill was introduced as an alternative but found little 
acceptance by the majority of the House. 
63London Times, July 1, 3.9431 P. 4. 
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In other speeches before the House of Commons, Sir 
Stafford Cripps surveyed Britain's economic state. The London 
Times, July 5, 1943, said, "Had there been no certainty of 
Marshall Aid by this time he would have been making a survey 
of a different sort which would have chilled and depressed 
everybody. There is little enthusiasm for an agreement which 
makes us dependent upon the generosity of the United States; 
but the alternative is too grim for serious contemplation by 
any political group except the Communists and their allies."65 
AS a private meeting of Conservative members they de- 
cided that in spite of many points open to criticism or re- 
quiring elucidation, the agreement did not call for an adverse 
vote from the opposition." 
The London Times, July 6, 1948, said, "as the debate opened 
by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the House of Commons 
yesterday demonstrated, only a few irreconcilables, mostly on 
the extreme left, now pretend that it would be better for 
Europe....to suffer the penury, unemployment, and discord that 
would be unescapable if aid were rejected than to accept the 
Ameridan offer of help as it is now made."67 
Parliament approved the agreement July 7, 19481by a 
majority in Commons of 407 to 12 and unanimously in Lords, and 
one hour later it was signed by Mr. Bevin and the United States 
66Loc. cit. 
67London Times, July 6, 1948, p. 4. 
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Ambassador. Mr. Bevin afterward expressed to the Government and 
people of the United States the gratitude of Great Britain for 
what he described as one of the series of agreements which 
marked the fulfillment of an outstanding feat of constructive 
statesmanship. 68 
In late July, Mr. Hoffman and Sir Stafford Cripps decided 
that an Anglo-American council to advise on methods of increasing 
British industrial efficiency would aid Britain in increasing 
production. This raised a storm of protests from two widely 
divergent newspapers, The Communist Daily Worker and the Lon- 
don Daily Express, Lord Beaverbrook's paper. The Daily Express 
said that British industry could learn nothing from anyone 
which few British industrialists would agree with.69 There 
was considerable concernation in Commons over this proposed 
Anglo-American council until Sir Stafford Cripps explained 
that there would be no investigation of British industry by 
the United States. Members appeared considerably appeased by 
Cripps' statement. Also the Commons were mollified when it was 
learned that the Federation of British Industries approved the 
plan as did the Trade Union Congress.7° 
Following this discussion of the Anglo-American Council 
for increased production there is not much published in the 
British newspapers on the Marshall Plan. There are scattered 
comments on various phases. Such a one occurred in October of 
1948. 
68London Times, July 27, 1948, p. 4. 
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Apparently there had been considerable complaint over the 
fact that Britain had to contribute $282,000,000 and release 
L209,000,000 sterling to European nations. The Spectator 
October 22, 1948, believed this should be put in the perspective 
of the United States giving $4,875,000,000 with Britain gaining 
the largest share. It said nobody had the right to complain 
until they saw how it worked and nobody could know at that 
time. It said, "As to the broader aims of promoting closer 
cooperation in western Europe, either it is worth some temporary 
sacrifice or Britain should not be associated with the European 
Recovery Program at all."71 
Another interesting comment was made in the London Times, 
January 8, 1949,upon the resignation of Secretary of State 
Marshalls 
In retiring at last to enjoy the peace and quiet 
he has so richly earned Mr. Marshall will have the good 
wishes of millions, not only in the United States but 
throughout the western world. To the Marshall Plan he 
brought the steady vision of a great strategist combined 
with the administrative ability of a great organizer. 
These qualities always infused by the unmistakable 
honesty of a noble character rather than by intellectual 
brilliance, won him the support of two great political 
parties in the United States and the willing cooperation 
of the countries of western Europe. In the two short years 
in which he has held the office of Secretary of State, 
George Marshall has shaped the policy of the western 
world. 72 
From this time until the fall of 1949 there are few 
comments worthy of inclusion in this paper. No expressions 
71"Price of Economic Recovery", Spectator, No. 6278, 
October 22, 1948, p. 1. 
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of public opinion seemed to be made. Britain seemed content 
with sitting back and watching how the Marshall Plan was 
working. In the fall of 1949 the problem of devaluation was 
met and overcome as has been discussed in Chapter III. Pro- 
bably the next major occurrence concerning the Marshall Plan 
in Great Britain was the suspension of aid in December of 
1950.73 
The London Times, December l4, 1950, remarked upon the 
suspension of aid, "All will welcome the fact that Marshall 
aid has ended in full agreement between giver and receiver. 
No untimely arguments, criticisms or complaints have marred 
the final act." It said the sterling area would share in 
Britain's gratitude and pride.74 
The Economist, December 16, 1950, said about aid suspen- 
sion: 
This country loses the support without which it 
could not have had through two post-war years, its food, 
its full employ4ent, and its rising production. There 
can neither be regret nor complaint that the aid has been 
taken away eighteen months early. The sterling area's 
dollar gap was closed a year ago. It is perhaps the 
best expression of the spirit in which aid was given 
that the Americans have willingly waited through 1950 
to see that this achievement appeared reasonably secure. 
Marshall Aid is the most straight-forwardly generous 
thing that any country has ever done for others, the 
fullest expression so far of that American idealism upon 
which all the hopes of the West depend. 7 
73See Appendix D for Joint Statement on Aid Suspension. 
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Probably one of the most appreciative statements was 
made by Mr. Hugh Gaitskell, acting Foreign Minister, in the 
House of Commons. He said: 
His Majesty's Government desires to express on 
behalf of the whole nation their deepest gratitude to 
the Government and people of the United States for their 
unprecedented generosity (cheers) in giving freely to 
Britain at a critical moment in history the means to 
regain her economic independence and power. 
It only remains for me to add that I am sure the 
whole House will give its warm approval to the sentiments 
expressed in the last paragraph. (cheers) We are not 
an emotional people and we are not always very articulate. 
But these characteristics should not be allowed to hide 
the very real and profound sense of gratitude which we 
feel towards the American people, not only for the mater- 
ial help they have given us but also for the spirit of 
understanding and friendship in which it has been given. 
I think we should all agree that with the very 
great assistance of M4rshall Aid and the efforts of our 
own countrymen we have achieved a remarkable recovery 
in a much shorter time than seemed possible.70 
Mr. Eden voiced the opinion of the Opposition when he 
warmly endorsed Mr. Gaitskell's sentiments.77 
It would seem that Britain was very well pleased with 
its progress under the Marshall Plan. It seemed to have 
appreciated the aid the United States had given but was very 
glad it was no longer dependent upon the United States. Bri- 
tain can hardly be blamed for this attitude for no group of 
people like to know they are indebted to another group for 
something they could not do themselves. 
76London Times, December 14, 1950, p. 6. 
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Britain has probably succeeded better than any country, 
which participated in the Marshall Plan, in achieving economic 
stability andlehabilitation. This would seem evident from 
her ability to discontinue with the need of Marshall Plan aid, 
eighteen months earlier than planned. Various reasons have 
been given in explaining why Britain was able to discontinue 
Marshall Plan aid. 
One factor which had a great deal of bearing on the 
subject would be the rearmament program which was developed 
in Britain in 1949 as a result of the western defense pact. 
This rearmament program stepped up production and as a result 
Britain was able to close her dollar gap in 1950. Of course, 
this is entirely a short-range recovery and if Russia should 
start trying to appease countries, which seems entirely un- 
likely, Britain might again need some form of aid for a time. 
Another reason given for discontinuation of aid was that 
the British people through tremendous sacrifices were able to 
do more with the aid they acquired than the other countries in 
Europe. A point in this argument has been raised which pointed 
out that England being a socialistic nation under a planned 
economy was able to distribute Marshall aid more effectively 
than countries which practiced a free system of enterprise. 
This argument has certain flaws in it which should be pointed 
out. Britain received by far the largest amount of Marshall 
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Plan aid, therefore it should be expected to make more rapid 
progress than countries which did not receive as much aid. 
Another point was that Britain probably did not sustain the 
tremendous havoc, which continental countries did, to their 
farm land and some factories. Some countries had to start 
practically from scratch and rebuild factories to produce goods 
they needed. England was concerned more with conversion of 
war plants to peacetime production. Actually it is difficult 
to see that there is much difference in a country's progress 
whether it is socialistic or capitalistic. 
A final obvious reason for Britain's abandonment of the 
Marshall Plan was that by now it had largely accomplished its 
work there. By 1950 British factories had been reconverted 
and modernized, raw materials were once more flowing into the 
country, production lines had been reestablished in all vital 
industries and England had recovered a large share of her 
markets. It could now show a favorable balance of trade within 
the sterling bloc and its deficits in the dollar area had been 
narrowed. The Labour Government had established a national 
economy, which if allowed to take its normal course would show 
a favorable balance of exports over imports and a slowly rising 
standard of living. This policy was requiring great sacrifices 
on the part of tie British public as consumers but it was ex- 
pected that this would be merely a temporary expedient on the 
way to a renewed prosperity. 
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There was a general satisfaction throughout Britain with 
the measure of recovery attained through Marshall funds, and 
a reluctant realization on the part of most that these funds 
would not be available much longer. Accordingly on December 13, 
1950, when the Marshall Plan was suddenly suspended, the British 
public accepted the news quietly and girded themselves to make 
their way, henceforth unaided. 
Since the Marshall Plan has been concluded it is dif- 
ficult to determine from the evidence available how the British 
public taken as a whole regarded it. Various social and 
economic groups held views which varied with their environment 
(and hereditary) circumstances. 
However, it can be safely said that the majority of the 
British nation appreciated to a greater or lesser degree the 
Marshall aid and the generosity with which it was given. The 
Labour Government backed the Marshall Plan all the way and 
cooperated to its utmost to make the Plan a success. It was 
vitally concerned over Britain's desperate need for dollars 
and other economic help and realized that it must cooperate with 
Europe as well as the United States in order to achieve economic 
stability and rehabilitation. Of course there were some in 
Britain who had opposed the plan from the beginning and could 
feel no gratitude for it now. The Communist party had fought 
Marshall Aid all the way. It was naturally committed both 
to world domination by Russia and a world wide Marxist revol- 
ution, the very things which Marshall Aid had been designed 
to oppose. 
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Another group in Britain which opposed Marshall aid was 
made up of the extreme conservatives. They felt Britain should 
not allow herself to become dependent on another nation. This 
group felt Britain could regain her former position without 
outside aid. One of the leaders of this group was Lord Beaver- 
brook. Apparently this group was obsessed with the idea that 
the Empire could save itself and they had not yet awakened to 
the idea that Britain had lost a great deal of its Empire, 
and that a large portion of the rest were demanding indepen- 
dence from Great Britain. 
The manufacturing group apparently approved of the 
Marshall Plan because they more than any other group realized 
the precarious position of Britain's economy following World 
War II. They realized Britain could not regain her export 
trade without outside aid, and to them as industrialists the 
main objective was the recovery of markets. 
To the great mass of the laboring population the Marshall 
Plan looked good because they stood to gain as consumers and 
had reason also to feel that rising production levels would 
bring rising wages. For a time they were afraid of losing 
through American funds, but gradually became reconciled as they 
recognized that devaluation would have its advantages as well 
as its disadvantages, for them. They stood to gain through any 
upsurge of business as long as the Labour Government could 
promise to supply social services free and control the price 
structure within the United Kingdom. 
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Finally, there is a psychological factor to be taken into 
account, which though intangible, yet has its importance. 
The British are a proud and independent people and it 
is hard for them to accept aid from another nation. Never- 
theless they appreciated the aid which was given them. Basi- 
cally, what they needed was the moral and financial impetus 
to restimulate their own mighty industrial and commercial 
system, which would then automatically call up the native 
energy and intelligence of the British people themselves to 
achieve their own salvation. The Marshall Plan allowed them 
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European Initiative Essential to Economic Recovery' 
I need not tell you gentlemen that the world situation 
is very serious. That must be apparent to all intelligent 
people. I think one difficulty is that the problem is one of 
such enormous complexity that the very mass of facts presented 
to the public by press and radio make it exceedingly difficult 
for the man in the street to reach a clear appraisement of the 
situation. Furthermore, the people of this country are distant 
from the troubled areas of the earth and it is hard for them to 
comprehend the plight and consequent reactions of the long suf- 
fering peoples, and the effect of those reactions on their 
governments in connection with our efforts to promote peace in 
the world. 
In considering the requirements for the rehabilitation 
of Europe, the physical loss of life, the visible destruction 
of cities, factories, mines, and railroads was correctly es- 
timated, but it has become obvious during recent months that 
this visible destruction was probably less serious than the 
dislocation of the entire fabric of European economy. For the 
past 10 years conditions have been highly abnormal. The fever- 
ish preparation for war and the more feverish maintenance of 
the war effort engulfed all aspects of national economies. 
Machinery has fallen into disrepair or is entirely obsolete. 
Under the arbitrary and destructive Nazi rule, virtually every 
possible enterprise was geared into the German war machine. 
Long-standing commercial ties, private institutions, banks, 
insurance companies, and shipping companies disappeared, through 
loss of capital, absorption through nationalization, or by 
simple destruction. In many countries, confidence in the local 
currency has been severely shaken. The breakdown of the business 
structure of Europe during the war was complete. Recovery has 
been seriously retarded by the fact that two years after the 
close of hostilities a peace settlement with Germany and Austria 
has not been agreed upon. But even given a more prompt solution 
of these difficult problems, the rehabilitation of the economic 
structure of Europe quite evidently will require a much longer 
time and greater effort than had been foreseen. 
There is a phase of this matter which is both interesting 
and serious. The farmer has always produced the foodstuffs 
to exchange with the city dweller for the other necessities of 
life. This division of labor is the basis of modern civilization. 
'Remarks by the SECRETARY OF STATE made on the occasion 
of commencement exercises at Harvard University on June 5, 
1947, and released to the press on the same date. Department 
of State, Publication 2882, European Series 25. 
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At the present time it is threatened with breakdown. The town 
and city industries are not producing adequate goods to exchange 
with the food-producing farmer. Raw materials and fuel are in 
short supply. Machinery is lacking or worn out. The farmer 
or the peasant cannot find the goods for sale which he desires 
to purchase. So the sale of his farm produce for money which 
he cannot use seems to him an unprofitable transaction. He, 
therefore, has withdrawn many fields from crop cultivation and 
is using them for grazing. He feeds more grain to stock and 
finds for himself and his family an ample supply of food, how- 
ever short he may be on clothing and other ordinary gadgets 
of civilization. Meanwhile people in the cities are short of 
food and fuel. So the governments are forced to use their for- 
eign money and credits to procure these necessities abroad. 
This process exhausts funds which are urgently needed for re- 
construction. Thus a very serious situation is rapidly devel- 
oping which bodes no good for the world. The modern system of 
the division of labor upon which the exchange of products is 
based is in danger of breaking down. 
The truth of the matter is that Europe's requirements for 
the next three or four years of foreign food and other essential 
products - principally from America - are so much greater than 
her present ability to pay that she must have substantial addi- 
tional help or face economic, social, and political deterior- 
ation of a very grave character. 
The remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring 
the confidence of the European people in the economic future 
of their own countries and of Europe as a whole. The manufac- 
turer and the farmer throughout wide areas must be able and 
willing to exchange their products for currencies the continuing 
value of which is not open to question. 
Aside from the demoralizing effect on the world at large 
and the possibilities of disturbances arising as a result of 
the desperation of the people concerned, the consequences to 
the economy of the United States should be apparent to all. 
It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is 
able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health 
in the world, without which there can be no political stability 
and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any 
country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, 
and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working 
economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political 
and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. 
Such assistance, I am convinced, must not be on a piecemeal basis 
as various crises develop. Any assistance that this Government 
may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a 
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mere palliative. Any government that is willing to assist in 
the task of recovery will find full cooperation, I am sure, on 
the part of the United States Government. Any government which 
maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect 
help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties, or 
groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit 
therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition 
of the United States. 
It is already evident that, before the United States 
Government can proceed much further in its efforts to alleviate 
the situation and help start the European world on its way to 
recovery, there must be some agreement among the countries of 
Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part 
those countries themselves will take in order to give proper 
effect to whatever action might be undertaken by this Government. 
It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government 
to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place 
Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the 
Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The 
role of this country shoilld consist of friendly aid in the 
drafting of a European program and of later support of such a 
program so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The 
program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not 
all, European nations. 
An essential part of any successful action on the part of 
the United States is an understanding on the part of the people 
of America of the character of the problem and the remedies to 
be applied. Political passion and prejudice should have no 
part. With foresight, and a willingness on the part of our 
people to face up to the vast responsibility which history has 
clearly placed upon our country, the difficulties I have out- 
lined can and will be overcome. 
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APPENDIX B 
The Committee to the Secretary of State 
Committee of European Economic Cooperation-I- 
Paris, 22nd September, 1947 
My Dear Mr. Secretary, 
In your speech at Harvard University on the 5th June you 
stated that, before the United States could proceed much fur- 
ther in its efforts to help start the European world on its way 
to recovery, there must be some agreement among the countries 
concerned as to the requirements of the situation and the part 
these countries themselves could play in order to give proper 
effect to whatever action might be undertaken by the Government 
of the United States. You suggested that the initiative in the 
drafting of a European programme must come from Europe, and 
that the programme should be a joint one agreed to by a number, 
if not all, of the European nations. You stated that an essen- 
tial part of any successful action by the United States was an 
understanding by the people of America of the character of the 
problem and the remedies to be applied. 
The programme which you suggested should be prepared has 
now been drawn up in the form of the attached initial Report 
by the 16 countries which accepted the invitation of the British 
and French Governments to attend a Conference in Paris opening 
on 12th July. This programme, which covers the 16 participating 
countries concerned and Western Germany,contains statements 
of production, requirements and future plans on which the 
governments of each of the participating countries have agreed. 
The Report has been drawn up in close and friendly coop- 
eration on the part of the countries concerned, and we hope 
that it will help to solve the economic problems which today 
face a large part of the European continent. 
(Signatures) United Kingdom, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, 
Yours very truly, 
/5/ Ernest Bevin, Chairman 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Turkey. 
'Committee of European Economic Co-Operation, Vol. 1, 
General Report, European Series 23, released September 1947. 
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APPENDIX C 
Britain and the Marshall Planl 
Manchester Guardianl 
5 April 1943 
This week end may prove to have been a turning point in 
the world's history; Mr. Truman was not speaking with improper 
arrogance-when he called the measure "perhaps the greatest 
venture in constructive statesmanship that any nation has ever 
taken." It is the constructive, or reconstructive, aspect of 
the plan which must be grasped and remembered and followed. 
The essence of Mr. Marshall's great conception proclaimed last 
June was that the united effort of the nations of Europe to re- 
build their bro4en economies with each other's help would call 
forth a generous response from the United States. The sixteen 
nations have begun that task at Paris, and the American people 
has magnificently expressed its confidence in them to carry it 
through...The credit for carrying through this great and contro- 
versial measure is shared by many: Mr. Marshall himself, for the 
massive authority with which he laid his proposals before the 
Froeign Relations Committees of the two Houses; President Truman, 
who has thrown the whole weight of his office behind his Sec- 
retary of State; Senator Vandenberg, whose tact and political 
judgment have drawn the stings from criticism without sacri. 
ficing any vital part of the measure. Nor should one forget 
the large number of Congressmen who, in the course of the last 
recess, visited various parts of Europe "to see for themselves," 
and went back with a quickened sense of urgency and a grasp of 
essential facts which, in Washington, have too often been con- 
fined to a small circle of specialists But by and large they 
have voted for the Plan because they knew that the American peo- 
ple was behind them and that Mr. Marshall's vision of European 
self-help made postible and fruitful by American aid had caught 
the imagination of the people in a way in which no proposals for 
military subventions or charitable reliefs could have done. "The 
greatest nation on earth," said Senator Vandenberg, "either 
justifies or surrenders its leadership." The United States 
has risen to the occasion. It is now for the nations of Western 
Europe to do no less. 
1Britain and the Marshall Plan, Published Statements by 
some Government Spokesmen, the Press, and a British housewife, 
British Information Services, June 19+8. 
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Daily Express2 
6 April, 1948 
Let us frankly comment upon the generous and spendid conduct 
of the American people and their Congress. 
They have gifted these immense sums of money and goods 
with every intention of rescuing their neighbors in trouble. 
They show a kindness of disposition worthy of a people 
who have for long sustained throughout the world the precepts 
of the Christian faith. They have declared themselves their 
brothers' keeper. 
The Marshall Plan is a gesture more striking than any 
that has gone before. 
Praise the warm feelings of the American nation. 
Recognize the high endeavor to help the distressed world. 
Financial Times3 
5 April 1948 
If we strive with unflagging energy for increased produc- 
tion, Marshall aid will represent the marginal assistance 
needed for the restoration of economic health and independence. 
But never let it be forgotten that the aid is purely marginal, 
and will achieve nothing in the long term unless it spurs our 
own efforts. Nor should it be forgotten that the fate of the 
Marshall Plan as a whole will be determined in a very large 
measure by our success or failure in making wise use of Amer- 
ican aid. 
We are the main industrial power among the participating 
countries, and will, therefore, be expected to make a major con- 
tribution to Western Europe's great need for additional supplies 
of capital and consumer goods. 
Apart from the great economic contribution which we can, 
and must, make to European recovery, the restoration of this 
country to strength and independence would be a stabilizing 
political influence of the greatest importance, If we fail to 
seize the great opportunity now presented us the whole project 
2 Loc. cit. 
3Loc. cit. 
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will fail. Western Europe will lie weak and impoverished and 
an easy prey to Communist infiltration. American security 
will be endangered, and the lamps of freedom and tolerance will 
die down throughout the world. Happily, this moment of crisis 
in world affairs is also a moment of opportunity thanks to the 
great, bold and imaginative gesture of the United States. But 
it is upon ourselves, even more than upon America, that the 
responsibility for success will lie...the Government, and 
capital and labor, must see to it that the passage of the Mar- 
shall Plan does not engender a fatal complacency. Given that 




Suspension of Marshall Aid to Britain' 
The following joint statement was issued on December 13 
by the Government of the United States and the United Kingdom: 
"After discussions between the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
and Mr. William L. Batt, Minister in charge of the E. C. A. 
mission to the United Kingdom, the Governments of the United 
States and the United Kingdom have agreed to the suspension 
of Marshall Aid to the United Kingdom from January 1, 1951. 
"In reaching this decision, the Governments have been guided 
by two considerations. First, the economic recovery of Britain 
and the Sterling Area as a whole has made such good progress 
that the dollar deficit has in recent months disappeared, - an 
achievement which, coming early in the third year of a four-year 
program, is a source of profound satisfaction to both Governments. 
Secondly, the defense program of the United States, which in- 
cludes the Mutual Defense Aid Program, will now impose new and 
heavier demands upon her economy. 
"The total of allotments of aid to the United Kingdom for 
the six months ended 31st December 1950 will remain at $175 
million, of which $150 million represents conditional aid matching 
equal sterling grants made by the United Kingdom to other coun- 
tries in the Organization for European Economic Co-operation 
through the European Payments Union. The United Kingdom will 
continue to draw upon these and previous allotments of aid until 
they are exhausted. Goods and services so financed will, there- 
fore, be reaching Britain for some months to come. In all, 
since the beginning of Marshall Aid, the United Kingdom has been 
allotted a total of $2,694.3 million. 
"The United Kingdom will remain a full participant in the 
Organization for European Economic Co-operation and the European 
Payments Union. Certain E. C. A. programs, in particular those 
for fostering overseas development, for the production of scarce 
materials, and for the interchange of technical knowledge to en- 
courage higher productivity, will be maintained. The United 
'British Economic Record, issued by British Information 
Services, 1950. 
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Kingdom will continue to be eligible for assistance under those 
programs, and the Economic Co-operation Agreement between the 
Government of the United Kingdom and the United States will 
remain in force for the time being. 
"The two Governments are not yet in a position to assess 
the ultimate economic impact of their mutual defense efforts, 
and the suspension of E. R. P. allotments to the United King- 
dom will, in no way, affect the arrangements which are now being 
worked out in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for the 
assessment and distribution of the burden of the defense pro- 
grams of its members. 
"The suspension of aid under the European Recovery Program 
does not mean that the recovery of the British economy is com- 
plete or that the financial resources of the Sterling Area are 
adequate. Both Governments recognize that parts of the im- 
provement in the position of the Sterling Area is due to ex- 
ternal factors which may well be temporary. Furthermore, new 
difficulties and burdens are certain to fall upon the British 
economy and balance of payments in 1951 as a result of the 
increased defense program and the impact of higher raw material 
Prices and prospective shortages. This understanding, there- 
fore, provides for the suspension, and not the termination of 
E. R. P. aid and for reconsideration if necessary. Neverthe- 
less, the extent of the recovery already achieved demonstrates 
alike the immense value of the European Recovery Program and 
the success of the efforts of the British people to meet and 
overcome the grave problems which they have to face. 
"The United States Government is especially pleased to 
see so prominent an example of the success of the European 
Recovery Program at this early date. 
"His Majesty's Government desires to express on behalf of 
the whole nation its deepest gratitude to the Government and 
the people of the United States for their unprecedented gen- 
erosity in giving freely to Britain at a critical moment in 
history the means to regain her economic independence and 
power." 
BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION ON THE MARSHALL PLAN 
An Abstract of a Thesis 
by 
PATRICIA McKEEMAN NELSON 
B. S.1 Kansas State College 
of Agriculture and Applied Science 
1949 
Department of History, Government, and Philosophy 
Kansas State College 
of Agriculture and Applied Science 
1951 
The purpose of this study has been to inquire into the 
attitude of the British public toward the Marshall Plan. In 
order thoroughly to investigate this subject it was necessary 
to analyze separate groups of the public such as laborers, 
manufacturers, government officials and minority groups. It 
was obvious from the beginning of the investigation that no 
clear cut attitude or opinion would be found which would in- 
clude the British public as a whole. Naturally economic factors 
had the largest influence upon attitudes, while the matter of 
political affiliation was also very important. 
At the outset an attempt was made to point out the various 
factors, such as a hard winter, in 1946-471 the inability of 
European countries to rehabilitate themselves, and Russia's 
evident lack of cooperation toward world peace, which made 
the statesmen of Europe and the United States realize the ne- 
cessity of forming some plan to aid Europe toward complete re- 
habilitation. 
On June 5, 19471 Secretary of State George C. Marshall, 
made a speech at Harvard University in which he outlined a plan 
to aid Europe. Events rapidly followed until on April 3, 19481 
the Congress of the United States passed the Foreign Assistance 
Act which provided economic aid for Europe. 
Britain had sustained some of the most severe hardships 
occasioned by the war and therefore was anxious to have some 
form of aid, so it actively supported the plan. 
In the next phase Britain's economic position in the world 
was discussed. Britain had received a loan from the United 
States in 1946 but it had been exhausted within a year. Its 
dollar reserve disappeared rapidly during the winter of 1947 
and it needed economic aid desperately. After the passage 
of the Foreign Assistance Act, Britain started regaining her 
economic position rapidly through the help of United States 
dollars and materials and her own efforts. In practically 
all fields such as importing and exporting, industrial produc- 
tivity, agricultural production and unemployment, Britain 
showed improvement during the time she received Marshall Plan 
aid. 
Britain had an important problem to solve during this 
period. She had to reconcile her leadership of the sterling 
area with her evident desire to cooperate with western Europe. 
Britain could not give up her position in the sterling area, 
yet she realized that she must cooperate with western Europe 
in order to make the Marshall Plan function. She attempted to 
coonerate with both areas by building up an export trade with 
western Europe in order to produce dollars to aid the sterling 
area. Britain cooperated with western Europe in forming econ- 
omic unions of which the most important was the European Pay- 
ments Union which helped to make currency interchangable. 
Another problem Britain faced was reconciling sterling 
with other currencies. In 1949, Britain finally found it 
necessary to devaluate the pound from $4.03 to $2.80. This, 
of course, caused considerable comment in Britain and was 
opposed by some groups; however, most groups only objected to 
the method in which it was done rather than devaluation itself. 
In the fourth chapter British public opinion was pointed 
out in chronological order. Immediately after Marshall's speech 
some groups were skeptical of the reasons behind such a move. 
Gradually as the plan took concrete shape, most Britons accepted 
it gratefully except for extreme Conservatives and the Communist 
Party. After the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act, Bri- 
tain expressed her deep appreciation of American generosity and 
statesmanship. Little comment was made during the time the 
Plan was in action but in December 1950, Britain decided she 
needed no more aid and issued a joint suspension with the United 
States of Marshall Plan aid. At this time there was a feeling 
of relief in Britain that the Marshall Plan was over and they 
were no longer dependent upon the United States. Nevertheless 
they appreciated deeply all that Marshall Plan aid had done to 
rehabilitate Britain. 
In the conclusion, the attitude of the various groups is 
pointed out. The manufacturers realized the need for the Mar- 
shall Plan and supported it. The laborers followed the Govern- 
ment line and also supported the Marshall Plan except for a few 
extreme leftists unions who followed the Moscow line. The Labour 
government supported and aided the Marshall Plan as much as 
possible. Most of the Conservative Party also supported the 
Marshall Plan except for a small group of extreme Conservatives 
who resented the suggestion of British dependence on the United 
States. The finding of this paper then was that the large 
middle group in Britain as represented by orthodox Laborites 
and moderate Conservatives wanted a rejuvenated capitalism 
modified by a few judicious social and economic controls. 
In order to discover the opinions of the British the writer 
did extensive research in periodicals such as the London Times 
and New York Times, pamphlets published by the British Infor- 
mation Services and the Economic Cooperation Administration and 
published speeches. There was considerable limitation put on 
the writer due to the lack of adequate British periodicals in 
the Mid-West and the almost complete absences of such material 
in the Kansas State College Library. 
